O N E result of tho advanced state of civilisatioii cjf the present day is that all nations become more or less fellow-sulferers by any disturbance of the pcacc. So the liiglicr tlic aspirations of a nation, the more valuable its possessions, the more noble its aims, and the more full of proniise its future, all the more imperative does it become its duty its it is also to its intercst to intervene for the niaiiiteiiance of peace.
The peaceful competition of nations aiid the duc fulfilment of the duties cast upon them by civilisation can only be assured by political power; which, in its turn, can only be upheld by ailequatc military strength. And the sword, to be eliective, must be able to make itself felt and ensure respect, even across the seas, and be sharp enough to enforce its will to prevent peace being disturbed. It is more diificult iii these days of high civilisation than formerly to make good the ravages of war, and the victor lias to suffer as well BS the vanquished; for wliile a nation in arms is employing its whole strength to ensure victory, it is tlireatened by the danger that its industries will be languishing, its trade suffering aiid passing into tlie Iiands of rivals, its civilisiiig mission a t a standstill, and, even in the event of a brilliant victory, a long period of depression will follom in all departments of its life.
It becomes, therefore, more thaii ever tlie duty of n belligerent Power, war once lriiidled, to bring it to an end in the shortest possible time. For .it is only by a,sliort war tliat the unchaining and interveiition of dangerous human passions can be guarded against. The more powerful the sword and the more skilfully i t is wielded, the more quickly will its work be.completed, the less will be the sacrifice in blood and property on both sides, and tlie more easy to be borne the after effects of tlic war.
It is, therefore, a natural and immutable demand of our time that, as tho commercial competition bctxveen nations becomes keener, there should also be a correspoiiding growth in their land and sea forces. A strong military Power can in all sincerity be considered as a guardian of the peace and promoter of the general well-being. The military strength of a nation is to-day in a certain measure a test of the value which it puts on its possessions, interests, and duties. B u t it is also true that a military Power is only strong if its moral development keep9 equal pace with its growth. This is no new requirement, but it has assumed a grenter importance with the destructive effect of modern Downloaded by [University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign] at 12:13 13 March 2015 590 EFFICIENCY OF ARMIES OF THE PRESENT DbY. \\-capons .and the growth of Armies, while a t the saine time it has become more difficult to ensure it.
The constantly increasing advance which tecliiiical knowledge has made in the present day has brought firearms to a high measure of perfection, as they can now be used with greater rapidity, greater precision, and at far longer ranges than formerly. The losses in future battles will not probably be heavier than in the past, for troops will only stand firm up to a certain point, and, their nerve once shaken, there will come a crisis; for the losses will be incurrod in a much shorter time, and, as battle-fields will 110 longer be enveloped in clouds of smoke, they will occur in full view of the combatants, and this will ~~a t u r a l l y tend to have a demoralising effect upon them. Detailed instructions for the training in the use of arms can be given, b u t this training demands moro care and time if the full advantage is to be derived from modern weapons. It is more dificult than formerly .to decide on the proper formations for battle tactics; for it will be necessary to advance on the enemy if decisive results are to be obtained; but as the attack in face of modern weapons must entail losses, it is impossible to lay down rules applicable to all cases. The instructions must allom greater latitude in the choice of methods than formerly, while greater demands will be made both on the leaders of all ranks and the soldiers. Officers and non-commissioned officers are always more exposed to fire than the men in carrying out their duties, hence they suffer n higher proportion of casualties, which have to be filled up from younger and presumably therefore less qualified sources. Moreover, conveying reports and orders, especially between the advanced fire-zones, will be much more difficult under n destructive fire than formerly. This all tends to make a picture of the battlefield less distinct than used to be the case, since the firing lines can no longer advance under cover of tlie smoke, and tlie lying down and the crawling forward of tlie fighting ranks has become much more important.
The commander, therefore, must possess greater foresight and a higher measure of the faculty of discrimination, both in his orders to his subordinates and the greater measure of independence he concedes them. These in their turn must be trained in a higher degree to think and act for themselves, must possess more strength of will, be able to assume a higher responsibility, and yet with their greater independence must understand the limits imposed upon them in can-ying out the duty assigned to them. I f the restraints of rigorous discipline are wanting,. greater independence can only lead to greater losses and disorganisation.
A quick eye to notice everything passing before him, acumen to detect and utilise t h e weaknesses of tlic enemy, and the advantages which the nature of the country may offer to himself, influence over his subcrdinates-as also upon those acting in conjunction with him in the battle-these are the virtues which from time immemorial have made valuable soldiers; and they are the qualities which to-day must be developed in our junior and youngest officers and among the men if we are to remain victors in battle. ic The more wheels a piece of mechanism has, the greater are the The chances of friction, which will prevent its working smoothly. Downloaded by [University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign] at 12:13 13 March 2015 larger the Ariny, the more iiuiiierous are its component parts, and tlicre must be all the greater care taken to prevent any oppoitunities for misundcrstandings or mishaps occurring.
The higher branches of Armies have increnscd both in iiamber aud strengtli, and especiaIIy. the Artillery; for the corps, in spito of the destructive effect of modern weapohs, have to be made capable of carrying out their duties independently. A t the same t h e the s u p p 1~ columns and trains are larger in proportion to the fighting troops than fornierly, and consequently the dead weight continually increases which is attached to them ; the different kinds of quick-firing weapons require niorc ammunition, and the larger Armies, as they mill no longer be able to subsist as much a s they used to do upon the theatre of war, must bo accompanied by grcatcr quantities of supplies.
The employment of larger niassesd of men limits the dispersal over the country of single units, as the demands on the line of communications to be used must be kept as low as possible, nor will a general care to run the risk of finding himself weak a t a decisive moment; tlie column of march will therefore be longer, the finding of slicker, as well as the providing of all that the Army requires, beconies more difficult, wliile the physical strain on the troops is also increased.
Long columns and restricted freedom of lateral movement (rl ritifreiheit) make changes iii the direction of masses once in motion nioro difficult, and do p o t as a rule admit of mistakes being repaired with impunity. A rapid cliange of front of an Army under these circumstances wliile keeping in touch with the supplies will always be diflicult. If unwieldiness is to be reduced to a minimum, a high measure of foresight and skill 011 the part of the conimaiiders is necessary, and their instructions to their subordinates must be quite clear. Foresight is a safeguard against being surprised, and makes i t possible, on the other hand, to surprise. the enemy. A surprise is a source of great danger when masscs of men are concerned. Foresight must be supported by thorough information about tlic enemy and his intentions. The larger the bodies of men to be moved, tlie earlier must the determination to do so be arrived at, and the necessary orders communicated, to ensure the movement being carried out in time.
It is therefore necessary to look well ahead' from the first. But tho bcst information and most practical orders are 'of no value if they do not reach the spot where they are required, so that tlie first can be used and the latter carried out. It is tliereforo of the greatest iriiportaiice to have a rapid niid trustworthy means of transmitting iiiforniatioii and orders over wide distances from the point of the furthest advance to headquarters, between neighbouring bodies and widely separated divisions of the Army. The larger the Armies which starid opposed .to each other, the moro numerous the units whose manceuvring has to be taken into consideration, the more-difficult is a just estimate of the situation, and the morc momentous the decision. Should the weapon fail, or should it be badly handled, then the larger the forces' the worse the defeat will be. Naturally both sides viill be well aware of this, so the struggle for the most complete victory will be all the more severe than formerly. Should either commander not feel equal to the task imposed upon him, all the greater will be the temptation to ward off as long as possible the decisive blow by drawing back, and in this way damaging the enemy, wliose cliief concern will lie to end the war as speedily as possible. Each opponent will endeavour to secure tlie superiority in U U~Uhers, b u t victory can only be hopecl for if on the sith of tho superim numbers arc also to bo found lilghcr moral aiid physical qualitied i m the tioops and greater skill on the part of the leaders.
Thc wcapon will not, however, fail, if its organ'isation, armament, and equipment of every kind, alid its training, particularly that> of its officers, havo been brought up to the stanclarcl demanclcd by modern war.
The importance of the strictcst discipline, as well as greater independence for modern fighting, makes it essential t h a t the leaders of every rank should liave learnt to thoroughly understand each other during peace nnd hare :in iiitiniate knowlcdge of tlicir troops. It will therefore be of the utmost value t h a t t h e units brought into the field, whether large or sillall, slioulcl have becn alrcady trained to act together, and as far as the creation of new ones is concerned, that the large proportion of oficers and lion-commissioned officers required for tliese should be kept ready in peacetime as supernumeraries.
B u t in view of the increased complesity of modern armaments and the purpose to which they are applied, and of the large number of Reservists who, in case of mobilisatioii, hare to be recalled from their work i n order to bring the Army up to a u a r footing, a most careful preparatioii in advance is requisite, cvcn d i e n the organisation of t h e peace Army approximates as marly ;is possible to that of the Army for the field.
Since t h e duties and responsibilitics of all ranlcs liave become greater, an increased measure of professional training is demanded. A thorough knowledge of one's duty gives confidence and selfdependence, and enables the possessor to influence others. And such knowledge must especially be required of the leaders of all ranks, who are the soul of the Army. The higher the soldierly knowledge and skill to be found i n it, the greater generally is the value of the Army. Example counts for much, and a highly capable body of officers is a guarantee for good troops.
The shortness of the period of service necessitates its being utilised to the fullest extent; biit the bow must n o t be strained, hence, as far as possible, all work must be escluded which is of n o military mlue, while the most approved means of instruction, suitable ranges, and extensive exercise grounds, must be provided. Above everything, whether exercises are on a small or large scale, they must be carried out as far as possible under \dint would be actual service conditions; so that the picture of warlike actuality, wliich impresses itsclf on both men and their leaders, may differ as little as possible from tlie reality, 60 that when the time comes they may not be taken by surprise b y the unexpected, and their steadiness jeopnrdised. Tlie greater mental and bodily strain which such a training entails must be met by increased care for the wclfare of the troops, by better quarters, and better nourishment. The larger the masses -of men who are to be led the more important is it that manceuvres should be undertaken by large units.brought as far as possible u p to war strength., They bring, :it least. in some measure before the eye, the difficulties of harmonising movement, time and space, and afford practical teaching not only for the higher commanders, b u t also for their mouthpieces, the officers of the general staff. It is only such manmuvres which m' &e it possible to practise, completc, and adopt a rapid and trustworthy method of communicating intelligence arid orders which will stand the test of war. Downloaded by [University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign] at 12:13 13 March 2015
Hand in hand with the practical professional training, and inscpnrable from it, must proceed the iiiculcatioii of the stiictest discipline, aiid a t tho samc time modest self-dependence, which, with an increase in volition, are pressingly demander! in ths fighting oi to-clay. Everybody must be coiivinced that tho most severe discipline is as necessary for tlic advantage and good of the individual as for the mhole. The abler the lenders, tlie more will they avail themselves of every opportunity to enforce this requirement.
Practical knomledgc cannot dispense with scientific; and the higher the standard of tlic general education of a nation-and with it that of the bulk of the Army-the greater becomes tlie necessity that tho leaders should combiiic the most perfect practical training with a high standard of military and general knowledge. And as long as this educatioli kceps apart from mere book-learning, as long as it is based on practical experience, and confers on its possessor greater freedom and confidence in the execution of his duty, it tends directly to tlie iniprovement of his professional education.
Military history takes a high place among tho subjects to be mastered to-day by officers. The conduct of war and leadership in battle aro iiaturally subject to contiiiual modification; but tlic changes brought about by modern weapons and the growth of armies are grezter and more important than formerly; and wc have no example as yet which will servo to guide us. All tlie more important and more difficult, tlierefore, is i t to obtain a just estimate of their influence, as also of the demands which they will impose upon the military machine and its proper use in the future. Only a mind carefully trained in military lore will be able to adapt itself to these new conditions.
The inen \die have been in positions to become acquainted with war on il large scale, and who hare acquired a really valuable and varied experience, arc becoming fewer aiid fewer : consequently, tlierefore, tlie study of military history Iias increased in importance, in ordcr to give to the rising generation a true picture of war and its requirements. I f it is constantly kept in view that in war one Iias to rcclioll with tlic unexpected, wit11 accidents aiid surprises of every kind, aiid that, as a rule, the time for observation, consideration, making up oiie's mind, and action, will be very short, and that all this Iias often to be done a t 3 critical moment, when both mind and body are exhausted, aiid yet nevcrtlieless the ways and means, alld also the iron strengtli of will, must be fouiid which will lead to the goal, \re shall not be bafled by the difference whicli esists between the exemplificatio!i of knowledge and capacity founded upon war and peace, and KC sliall recogiiise that simplicity, both in the form of the niilitary niachi~ie ns well as in its use, is tlie most importaut factor. The longer peace lasts, the more readily will this be forgotten. I f then, changes recognised as 1ieccssai-y arc talren in hand when the opportnnity sci-ves, we sllali be spared disappointments in war and not be compelled to seek remedies after dearly-bought experiences.
That besides niilitary history, a11 study illcreasing the professional knowledge of oficers, particularly that relating to the leading and employment of troops mid the proper study of war in its different branclies, has assumed increased iniportance, needs 110 proof.
In addition, such studies deserve greater consideratioll, which develop judgment of iiien and matters, aiid increase a mall's >elf-reliallce and influence upon others. I n this connection a kllowledge of otlier Downloaded by [University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign] at 12:13 13 March 2015 nations and countries must be considcrod, including as far as possible a thorough knowledge of foreign languages. Familiarity with a country and its people-of wliat may probably be a theatre of war, as Tell as a knowlcdge of the language-was i n former days an advantage, b u t to-day such knowledge has much increased in importance; for it will lessen friction, permit of the duties in the enemy's country being simplified and more quickly and reliably carried out, besides tending t o economy in time and labour--mliicli are of tlie more importance tllc larger the size of tlie armies.
A personal knowledge, therefore, of a country and its people is particularly useful.
Residence in a foreign country generally develops self-reliance, sharpcns the gift of observation, enlarges the mental horizon, matures the power of disccrnnient more rapidly, and inalies a man more unprejudiced in dealing with wliat is new and strange. Knowledge of human nature is more readily acquired under these conditions tlian in the narrow circle of liome-life wit11 its many limitations. Thus it will be of special service t o those officers who will be employed i n liigli commands and in tlie more importaut posts, if t h y were given the opportunity to acquire this knowledge tlirough travel, especially in civiliscd countries; aiid t h e ample means of communication in these days makes such travelling easy.
..
ic Q
-. Technical science lias from time immemorial played an important part i n the service of tlie Army; but, however perfect the war material with mliicli it supplies US, tliere remains always tlie more difficult a r t of turning this material to tlie best practical use i n the field; hence teclinical science and education must 011 no account be allowed t o supersede t h e tactical. There is notliiiig inconsistent, however in conceding a somcwhat wider field nowadays to these matters tlian was formerly tlic case.
The destructive effect of modern wcapons, aiid the size of modern Armies, necessitate the calling in to our assistance of technical science wherever it can be utilised, but it is necessary to adapt it to the requirements of practical service i n the field, and these are so unique from many points of view that, even when based on the general progress of meclianical industry, tliere will nevertlieless always remain special brandies applicable for war purposes in ' which further developments must take place. Simplicity in construction, arrangement and nietliod of use, capacity to rcsist destroying influences of every kind aiid to stand reckless handling, arc important requirenients wliicli. must be complied with.
The numbers of the technical troops have, 011 the whole, kept pace with tlic growth of the Arniy, b u t not altogether in proportion to the increased number of teclinical problems wliicli need solution in war to-day. Thus, all arms without esceptiou niust take upon themselves tlie esccution of the niany different forms of technical work, and as long as certain fiscd limits arc not overstepped, this can be done without more important interests suffering. The more the military forces of great States are drawn from the same classes, tlic more does i t behove them to outvie the others in arming themselves with the latest improvements. and the better the weapons, the greater is tlie technical Iilio\vledge necessary to develop tlic full advantages these confer.
If successful olicratioiis are to be 1ilidertakeii diicIi rcqiiire tIie suddeil nioveineiit of a liiigc army of today, without regard to tli: Downloaded by [University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign] at 12:13 13 March 2015 difficulties of the country and tlie communications, technical science must help in smoothing the road, in creating as rapidly as possible the means of communication freed from all obstacles, and also in destroying the same means of communication, should it be necessary to check the advance of the enemy.
New Reapons lead continually to new means of protection, and t l i e s~ again to further improved arms, so that tlie proportion of one to the otlier remains in general much about the same. Permanent fortifications brought up to date can always do good service, if their use is rightly understood Their value cannot be assessed on general principles; it depends on inany factors, wvliicli may be changed by the military position and are not easily estimated, b u t in the main their value will depend on the skill of the leaders, on whom will lie the use to wliicli they will be put, as also their attack or defence. The better armaments mill, of themselves, give no ground for increasing the present permanetit fortifications, the teiidency of t h e present day being ratlicr to restrict them, as tlicy require t h c multiplication of special weapons and war material of all sorts, besides retaining troops as garrisons, which could be employed elsewhere.
B u t new weapons will continually need adjustment and 'improvement, and this demands to-day not only more abundant material resources, b u t also a higher degree of technical knowledg2 and skill.
The possibility t h a t in B future campaign a battle may be fought more frequently in the neigli4ourhood of fortified positions prepared beforeliand and that, a t close quarters a t least, the erection of artificial cover will be of value, necessitates consideration i n the equipment of modern Armies, and increases tlie demands on the training of the troops. The TZZe wliicli fortifications will play in a campaign cannot, however, be calculated i n advance; it will be influenced by the nioml of tho troops and the character of their,leading.
The means of communication of our generation afford indispensable technical aids for the carrying on of war.
The Army in gcneral can only incrcase with tlie development of the means of communication. First in importance is tlie railway system of t h e countiy, which must bc adapted to the military interests. Tlie rapid niobilisation and assemblage of a modern army, as well as military requirements during t h e time tlie M*ar lzsts, make such exceptionally heavy demands on both t h e railway and telegraph services of the country t h a t tlicy can only be met if everything in these departmeuts is in complete order and fully organised for all emergencies, with a staff of expcrienced higlicr officials and trustworthy and perfectly trained juniors, and tlie military preparation for using them placed in the most sltilful hands. The larger the numbers wliicli are to be conveyed, all the more are disturbances in the traffic felt.
Immediate removal of the causes of interruptions is a pressing necessity, if serious results are not to accrue. Therefore n body of troops, specially and fully trained for the work, and provided wit11 the most serviceable material for the repair of bridges, etc., must be held in readiness in sufficient strength to carry out this duty.
Tlie question of forwarding supplies securely for the Army, as well as striking out everything that is superfluous, becomes a more difficult and more important matter the larger the Army is. It is, therefore, a matter of great urgency to make it possible to resume traffic on destroyed railways in occupied IiosZilc territory as rapidly as possible. needs, or should their repair require too long a time, the rapid,constructiou of field railways becomes necessary. B u t both are only possible if a trained body of men, with no lack of material, is available. AIoreover, for tlic completion of field railways the tcchiiical branch will have to provide mecliaiiical means of transport, useful for war purposes, in order to meet the requirements of t h e m a s of transport on the military lines of route. 1 1 particularly important problem whicli calls for solution by military technical science a t the present time is thc provision for the use of the leaders of the Army, both superiors and subordinates, of a . rapid and ti-ustwortliy method of conveying information and orders. Every system at present in use has its natural weali spots, while tliere is not one whicli fulfils all requirements. Wire telegraphy is liable to be affected by electrical disturbances, and, owing to the dificnlty of protection in a n enemy's country, is especially exposed to interruption; a t the sam time, getting i t into working-order often takes inore time than is available. Optical telegraphy IS easier to protcct, its a p p r a t u s can be rapidly made available for use, and is suited for long distance signalling either by day or night; for secondary military purposes, a t least during an action, where a few words or some signal previously agr2ed upon are sufficient, this inetliocl is of great value; b u t fog, rain, or snow are its enemies. Wireless telegrapliy, uninfluenced by weather as it is, altliougli still only in its infancy, must be considered for use i n tlie field, but here there are difficulties also.
Balloons must be favoured by chance and t h e direction of t h e wind, wliile captive ones require a clear atmosphere with comparative calm. Carrier pigeons can only be used i n very rare circumstances. The fast automobile can be used for conveying information and verbal orders long distances, provided there are good roads. It comes t o this: t h a t all meaim of communication, wliicli technical science provides, must be a t command, with thoroughly trained staffs, and a sufficient supply, so t h a t i n any cas? one, and if possible several, of the difiereiit methods may be available. The difficulty will be in efficient training and in liceping them all in readiuess for service. A liiglily developed system of railway communication in their own country, with a body of railway troops carefully trained to the Kork, with Iiome manufactories capably managed, are the important preliminary conditions for the employment of large armies. Aleclianical nietliods of transport maintain tlie supplies required for food and warlike necessaries and make for greater freedom i n . tlie operations ; while a proper method of commuiiicating information helps to compensate for the difficulties crentcd by tlic massing of men, makes it possible to work as widely-separated bodies of troops, saves waste of poimr, and even lessens losses.
The military service of t o d a y thus accepts unreservedly the claims of technical science, b u t tliat the latter sliould be used to tlie best advaiitage demands not only a liberal expenditure of money, b u t also calls for higher professional training of the soldiers, aud above all of 'the officers. li'itll the progress of technical knowledge tlio conduct of warlike operations will undergo further development, but. teclinical sciencc Iias its limitations, which require to be carefully wntclied, otlierxise the danger esists that, with t h e increased complexity of material, the necessary simplicity of all actioh in face of the enemv may be lost sight of. It is thercforc necessar~ that the numerous improvement3 which tlie liiglily-tlcvclopctl tccluiical scicnce of our tinic puts a t tlie disposal of tlic Army sliould bc subjcctcd to the most S C V C~C tcsts 1111der service conditioiis before being adopted for use ill thc field.
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The active period of service is almost universally too short for imparting all the qualities, tcnding to make up ' tlie strength of an army, wliicli are demancred to-day. But as a preliminary to its work and halid iii hand with it, go the education of the people and the school of life, wliicli arc sliaped aiicl influenced by the State. For the State lias a paramount intcrcst not only in demanding those qualities that are of use to tlie dcfciiders of the Fatherland, but i n . ensuring them. F o r tlie majority of the Army in case of mobilisation is drawn froin tlic Reserves, and in almost all, cases in almost all countries the men :ire traiisfcrred from the regular and narrow restricted life of the factory, to tlie constantly clianging, strenuous work of war, wliicli claims the men's whole energies.
Bodily strength, niental and moral soundness, stroiig iiervcs, tlic best possible education, skill in liis civil calling, the habit of working, are qualities which one can only wish sliould be possessed by everyone liable for service on his entrance into tlie Army, and which the men i n the Reserve should strive to rctain. These qualities are also the soil which fosters strength of will, the developing and strengthening of which is one of tlie most important problems of military education.
Only 1iealthy.bodies and minds can develop the extraordinary powers called for a t times of great stress, and withstand the greater mental strain induced by the fighting of the present day.
Good school education makens tlie understanding, opens t h e eyes, calls out the powers of observation, and makes for trustworthiness and sclf-dependence in thought and judgment. A n d the more perfect the man's knowledge, and the more practical experience he has had in his civil calling, all the more valuable will lie be when lie is called upon to use his knowledge and skill under the more difficult conditions of war; and it is only by a n earnest, continuous military education, under t h e inculcation of the most stringent discipline, t h a t he caii adapt himself fully to meet these conditions. Only from a peace army, which in organisation, equipment, and training comes up fully to t h e demands of nmdern mar caii welltrained men be drawn for high command who will be equal to the more difficult duty imposed upon them, and understand how to use with success the implement to their hand. For it is tlie men of ripe and valuable practical experience, who consider well t h e feasibility and the consequences of what they propose to do, and wlio are accustomed to observe, and form their judgments from a higher standpoint, who are able to act with self-reliance, and show themselves leaders in the highest ,sense of the word. Such men's capacity for making up tlieir minds will not detract from their higher discretion, while their strength of will, fearless of the friction tlieir resolves encounter, will guarantee tlie attainment of tlie object of their desire. in a peaceful competition with otliers; but on the other hand, IIO nation mhich dispenses with an ideal goal can be trained to the duties which its education lays upon it, and although it may bo able to amass wealth, i t will be scarcely strong enough to protect itself in times of danger. Thero is a very lhely feeling that where .z high standard of true culture' is reached, the nation must be sound both morally and physically. Such R nation will also show itself capable of solviiig the problhms which fall to it in war outside its scene of action; since a great war affects tlie whole nation and the country, wlietliei-the enemy is ablo to penetrnto into it or not. For not only have arrangements to be made for R continual flow of reinforcements, to meet the drain of u-ar, and of supplies of all kinds, but-so far as is a t t a i n a b l c f o r the carrying on of the peaceful struggle in the regions of trade and industry. Not only must tlie sources of industry be preserved from extinction, but they must flow n i o e freely if possible, in order that the means may be available for sustaining a prolonged war, and successfully emerging from it without lasting damage t o the general well-being of the counti-y. It is selfevident that this becomes a matter of greater difficulty, the larger the number of the sons of the Fatlierland who are re-called unexpectedly to the colours, the higher the civilisation of the country, and the more numerous the threads which war threatens to snap, and which must be taken up by substitutes, since they may not be permanently broken. This interchange between soldiers and civilians is only possible where a nation is morally and physically sound, and thoroughly skilled in every department of life, and where there is a high standard of capacity for work. % ii-
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The size of an army is limited by the possibility of organising, arming, equipping, training, and providing it with a sufficient number of capable leaders, so that it may be trusted to meet the demands which a war to-day will make upon it. This limit differs for different nations; the available source from which the personnel can be drawn is among other features of importance.
The Commander-in-Chiaf is the inspiring spirit of the Army. The larger i t is and tlie shorter the period of service, the more will i t bear the distinguishing characteristics of the nation. Both during tlie pence training and on active service every means ninst be adopted to advanco tlie good and weed out the bad. Naturally, however, the methods to be adopted for bringing an Army up to tlie highest standard must vary. What is good in otlicr Armies cannot be adopted a t short notice, a grafting of foreign shoots upon the fighting force of a country is not easily effected. The power to put forth new branclies must be derived, as in the case of an oak, always from its own roots. Thus i t will be seen t h a t the conditions on which the efficiency of a modern Army ultimately depend are both complex and difficult to analyse; but without their due comprehension tho successful prosecution of a war is impossible.
War is the final arbiter between nations, and it alone decides whether the conditions for survival are present in the race, and have been duly and intelligently appreciated.
It is not only the touchstone of the Army but of the nation itself. 
